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I. Introduction
1. The assessment of the effects produced, within the Italian legal system, by foreign decisions 
regarding intercountry adoption of children by single persons still represents a controversial issue both 
among national courts and scholars.
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2. On the basis of a brief outline of the legal framework governing the matter as well as of the 
related interpretative approach followed by the prevailing jurisprudence, this paper aims at setting out 
some reflections on the compatibility of such regime of recognition with the fundamental right to family 
life enshrined, as well known, in Art 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) such as 
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), according to which a violation of said 
right may be devised also in cases where familial status validly and permanently established abroad are 
denied transnational effects. 
II. The legal framework governing intercountry adoptions in Italy
3. The legislative framework governing the recognition, in Italy, of the effects stemming from 
adoption decisions issued abroad stands out for the remarkable stratification of the provisions which it 
is made up of.
4. Such a character – which constitutes in itself a drawback – is all the more regrettable if one 
comes to consider that it concerns a subject matter – i.e. international adoptions – whose regulation 
should be clear and give rise to no uncertainty, given that its primary objective consists – as it will better 
arise below – in the child’s best interests being fully satisfied. For the purposes of exactly identifying the 
rules governing recognition of adoption decisions rendered abroad it therefore seems useful to prelimi-
narily outline the complex legal framework existing on the matter.
5. To be taken into account first is Law No 218 of 31 May 1995, which provides the “Reform of 
the Italian system of private international law”. Chapter V of Title III of such Law is in fact dedicated 
to adoption. It is made up of four articles, which on purpose do not deal with every and single issue the 
Italian legal system may be concerned with when faced with intercountry adoption.
6. Arts 38 to 41 of Law No 218/1995 are indeed concerned with the conditions triggering the ex-
istence of the Italian jurisdiction and the determination of the law applicable to adoption both of children 
and adults whenever the relationship features an international character, as well as with the requirements 
for the recognition and enforcement of the related decisions issued abroad.
7. However, beside the abovementioned provisions one has to consider also Law No 184 of 4 
May 1983, regarding adoption and custody of children, as amended, first, by Law No 476 of 31 De-
cember 1998, authorizing the ratification and implementation of the 29 May 1993 Hague convention on 
protection of children and cooperation in respect of intercountry adoption, and, subsequently, by Law 
No 149 of 28 March 2001. 
8. As a matter of fact, the rules currently governing intercountry adoption in Italy are those 
emerging from the alignment of Law No 184/1983 to the 1993 Hague Convention1, aimed at guarantee-
ing that said relationships be established in accordance with fundamental rights by means of a system of 
cooperation among contracting States whose main purpose is that of fostering – pursuant to the child’s 
best interests – the recognition of adoptions created in the contracting States’ legal orders and on the ba-
sis of the convention itself. The rules laid down by the convention are therefore of the utmost importance 
whenever a child habitually resident in a contracting State (State of origin) has been or is to be moved 
to another contracting State (receiving State) either after his or her adoption in the State of origin by 
persons habitually resident in the receiving State, or for the purposes of such an adoption in the receiving 
State or in the State of origin.
1 Reference is obviously made to the convention made under the auspices of the Private International Law Hague Confer-
ence, which entered into force on 1 May 1995. The convention has been ratified both by States that are member of the Confer-
ence and States which are not party thereto. An updated list of the contracting parties is available at http://www.hcch.net.
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9. The conflict of laws provisions set forth by Law No 218/195 and the rules embodied in Law 
No 184/1983 as subsequently amended are therefore strictly interrelated; this is confirmed (i) by the 
fact that, for the purposes of the recognition of intercountry adoption decisions, Art 41.2 of Law No 
218/1995 makes reference to the special rules on children adoption as well as (ii) by the existence, 
among the substantial rules on intercountry adoption, of provisions of a private international law char-
acter which especially deal with the effects that foreign adoption decisions are allowed to display within 
our legal system.
10. Art 41 of Law No 218/195 is made up of two provisions: the first one, despite its making 
reference to the general rules on recognition of judgements as laid down by Arts 64 ff of Law No 218 
itself, is only apparently of a general character. As it arises from its second paragraph, in fact, the said 
provision is applicable only insofar as the decision to be recognised does not concern full adoption of a 
child. The general rules on recognition of foreign judgements provided by Law No 218 shall, in other 
words, come into play only to the extent that the foreign adoption decision does not create a permanent 
parent-child relationship.
1. The rules on recognition of intercountry adoptions of children
11. As a consequence, when the adoption decision actually establishes a relationship of this kind 
the recognition thereof has to take place in accordance with the special rules on adoption of children as 
laid down by Law No 184/1983.
12. The recognition of adoption decisions issued abroad is governed by Arts 35-36 of Law No 
184/1983, which design a mechanism involving the participation of both the Commission for inter-
country adoption (which has its headquarters at the Prime Minister’s Office) and the Youth court of the 
adoptive parents applicants’ place of residence2. 
13. More precisely, Art 35.2-3 governs recognition in cases where adoption has already taken 
place in another State party to the 1993 convention prior to the child’s arrival in Italy. In such cases 
adoption shall undergo a control aimed at ascertaining its compliance with the requisites established by 
Art 4 of the convention itself. To this end, it has to be verified that the competent authorities of the State 
of origin have: (i) declared that the child is adoptable; (ii) determined, after possibilities for placement 
of the child within the State of origin have been given due consideration, that an intercountry adoption is 
in the child’s best interests; (iii) collected the necessary consent by persons and institutions; (iv) ensured 
that the child has been counselled, informed and, when required, has given his or her consent to adop-
tion. Moreover, it is required that the Commission for intercountry adoption has previously authorised 
the child’s entry and stay in Italy. When all such conditions are met, the adoption decision is transcribed 
in the registries of civil status. Such transcription gives the child the status of son or daughter of the 
adoptive parents and definitively makes him or her an Italian citizen.
14. If the adoption is to take place after the child’s entry into Italy, Art 35.4 of Law No 184/1983 
provides that the foreign decision be recognised as pre-adoptive foster care. When one year has elapsed 
since the child’s entry into the new family, provided that such solution matches the same child’s interests, 
the Youth court is to issue the adoption decision ordering the transcription thereof in the civil status registry.
15. Pursuant to Art 36.4, when the adoptive parents have continuously stayed and resided for at 
least two years in the same foreign country where adoption took place, such adoption is to be given full 
effects in Italy provided that it complies with the principles enshrined in the 1993 Hague convention. To 
this end, it is not required that the applicants adoptive parents be previously declared eligible to adopt 
2 Pursuant to Art 35.5 of Law No 184/1983, the Youth court vested with territorial competence is the court sitting in the 
district where the aspirants adoptive parents reside at the date of the minor’s entry in Italy.
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nor the intervention of the competent authorities nor the certification, to be usually issued by the Com-
mission for intercountry adoption, that the adoption complies with the Hague convention.
2. The grounds for refusal of recognition
16. As far as the grounds for refusing recognition are concerned, Art 24 of the 1993 Hague con-
vention stipulates that «The recognition of an adoption may be refused in a Contracting State only if the 
adoption is manifestly contrary to its public policy, taking into account the best interests of the child».
17. The said provision has been implemented by the Italian legislator by means of Art 35.3 of 
Law No 184/1983, which provides that when lodged with an application for recognition of intercoun-
try adoption the Youth court is bound to ascertain that such adoption does not violate the fundamental 
principles which govern Italian law on family matters, to be appreciated in respect of the child’s best 
interests. 
18. According to such provision, therefore, the public policy clause contemplated by the con-
vention as the unique ground for refusing recognition of adoption has been implemented by the Italian 
legislator by means of a referral to the fundamental principles underpinning domestic law on family 
matters, which are meant to come into play subject to the consideration of the child’s best interests.
19. As already mentioned, the protection of said interests represents the principle underlying 
the whole convention, whose objective, pursuant to Art 1 let. a), is «to establish safeguards to ensure 
that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child and with respect for his or her 
fundamental rights as recognised in international law». The very same principle is indeed the guiding 
principle of the Italian law on adoption which, as remarked, intends to implement the convention within 
the national legal order.  
20. In reality, the need to primarily safeguard the child’s interests is in itself among the funda-
mental principles of the Italian legal system insofar as its origin are to be traced back to international law 
(in particular, to Art 3 of the 1989 New York convention on the rights of the child) as well as to European 
Union law (within which such principle is enshrined in Art 24 of the EU Chart on fundamental rights): 
the public policy clause is therefore to be deemed as strictly instrumental in the protection of the child’s 
best interests.
21. This implies that, much more than in other matters, when dealing with adoption issues Ital-
ian courts should refrain from rigorously sticking to the legal institutions existing under domestic law, 
especially in cases where the applicant adoptive parent is a single person.
III. The Italian regime of recognition of intercountry “full” adoptions of children by single persons
22. In light of the well-established jurisprudence of the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cas-
sazione), the adoption decisions handed out abroad in favour of single persons are admitted to display 
in Italy only the limited effects recognised to the so called adoption in particular cases as envisaged by 
Art 44 of the Italian Law on adoption. This means that, even when the adoption decision is capable of 
producing, in the country of origin, the effects of full adoption, the entire recognition of such effects in 
Italy is precluded. This approach rests on the adoption in particular cases being conceived as not capable 
of interrupting the relationship between the child and his/her family of origin and giving rise to parental 
links between the former and the family of the adoptive parent. 
23. It is therefore not disputed whether such decisions are to be denied recognition on the 
grounds of their alleged contrast with public policy; rather, they are denied recognition as full adoption 
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decisions despite their being qualified as such in their country of origin. This may clearly result in the 
effects of such decisions being altered or eventually manipulated.
24. The reason behind such approach is that the adoptive parent fails to meet one of the requi-
sites which, according to the Italian law on adoption, must be satisfied for the declaration of eligibility 
to adopt to be issued, i.e. a marital relationship.
25. This limitation results in the specific procedure to be followed (1) when the single resides in 
Italy and he or she decides to start the intercountry adoption proceedings therein as well as (2) when the 
single resides and stays continuously, for at least two years at the date when adoption takes place, in the 
foreign country of origin of such adoption, and subsequently applies for the recognition thereof before 
the territorially competent Italian Youth court.   
1. The procedure to be followed if the single resides in Italy …
26. In the first case the aspirant adoptive parent is bound to lodge the Youth court of the place of 
his/her residence with a request for authorisation to adopt pursuant to Art 44 of the Law No 184/1983, 
since the declaration of eligibility to adopt based on Art 29a of such Law cannot be issued due to the 
requisite of the marital relationship being lacking.
27. This has eventually been clarified by the Italian Constitutional Court in its decision No 
347/2005, which stated that “on the basis of the rules currently in force, it is not possible to hold that the 
certificate of eligibility to adopt cannot be issued for intercountry adoption in particular cases, with the 
consequence that such certificate shall be released whenever the conditions laid down in Art 44 are met”; 
“such certificate shall be deemed instrumental in the particular cases of adoption envisaged by Art 44 
and, during the phase of recognition of the foreign adoption decisions, an appreciation shall be carried 
out of the existence of the conditions triggering adoption in such cases”.
28. The authorisation to adopt pursuant to Art 44 is necessary regardless of the adoption having 
taken place either in a State party to the 1993 convention (see Art 35.6 lett. b of Law No 184/1983) or in 
a State which is not a party thereto (see Art 36.2, lett. b-c, of Law No 184/1983).
29. Irrespective of the country of origin enabling singles to full adoption of a child, in Italy these 
persons cannot be authorised to adopt but for the sole purposes and to the limited effects of adoption in 
particular cases, i.e. for a kind of adoption unsuitable to create a permanent parent-child relationship.  
2. … and the one applied to singles residing in the country of origin of adoption
30. When, by contrast, the conditions triggering the application of Art. 36.4 of Law No 184/1983 
are met (that is to say that the applicant adoptive parent has given proof of his/her having resided and 
continuously stayed, for at least two years, in the foreign State where adoption took place), the authori-
sation to adopt is not necessary3. Yet, also in these cases the adoption cannot be given but the limited 
effects envisaged by Art 44 of Law No 184/1983 (irrespective of Art 36.4 of such Law establishing that 
in said cases adoption is to be recognised to all effects), subject only to the ascertainment of its compli-
ance with the 1993 convention.
31. It therefore bears no relevance the fact that, according to the rules of the country of origin 
– where the adoptive parent has resided and continuously stayed for at least two years – the adoption es-
tablished a permanent parent-child relationship: such adoption cannot be recognised in our legal system 
but as adoption in particular cases, i.e. as a kind of adoption which, by its very nature, is unsuitable to 
create a permanent parent-child relationship.
3 As it is inferable from Art 29a.2 of Law No 184/1983.
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3. The Italian Supreme Court’s approach as regards the effects to be given to intercountry “full” 
adoptions of children by singles
32. The above has eventually been confirmed by the Italian Supreme Court by means of its 
judgement No 3572/20114. The case concerned the recognition of a full adoption decision issued in the 
district of Columbia in accordance with a previous decision rendered by the regional court of Lipetsk 
(Russia); the Genoa Youth court recognised the adoption pursuant to Art 44 let. d) of Law No 184/1983, 
whereas the Court of second instance dismissed the appeal filed by the adoptive parent against such a 
partial recognition.
33. Before the Supreme Court the claimant invoked, among others, Art 36.4 of Law No 184/1983 
and complained about the Italian competent authorities having denied, in contrast with such legislative 
provision, recognition of adoption to all effects, subject only to the previous control of its compliance 
with the Hague convention: since adoption was qualified as “full” pursuant to both USA and Russian 
rules, such adoption should have been given the same effects in Italy as well, also in light of Art 23 of the 
Hague convention providing for the recognition de plein droit (“by operation of law”) of intercountry 
adoptions created in accordance with the convention itself.
34. The claim, however, has been dismissed by the Supreme Court arguing that, even if Art 
36.4 of Law No 184/1983 were to be applied, intercountry adoption must nonetheless comply with the 
general principle referred to in Art 35.3 of the same Law, i.e. the fundamental principles underpinning 
domestic law on family matters.
35. And it is the Supreme Court’s opinion that among such principles is the requisite of the 
marital link which Law No 184/1983 still addresses as a condicio sine qua non for the aspirants adoptive 
parents to be declared eligible to adopt in accordance with the child’s best interests.
36. As remarked by the Court, in fact, also the cases in which Art 25.4-5 of Law No 184/1983 
admits full adoption by a single person presuppose that, during the period of pre-adoptive foster care, 
the child has eventually been placed with a married couple and allows for the authorisation to adopt in 
the exclusive exceptional cases of either supervening death or incapacity of one of the spouses or their 
legal separation during the adoption proceedings.
IV. The reasons underlying the Italian Supreme Court’s approach
37. It is undeniable that the above described approach is the result of the current status of the 
Italian rules on adoption, also in light of the amendments brought about by the recent legislative decree 
No 154/2013.
38. Indeed, as written in the explanatory report to the draft of such decree those who are adopted 
pursuant to Art 44 of Law No 184/1983 are to be recognised the same status as that of adopted adults. 
This is due to the fact that in both cases the link with the family of origin is not interrupted, with the 
consequence that the adoption cannot be described as “full” pursuant to Art 27 of Law No 184/1983, as 
recently amended by the abovementioned decree.
39. It is likewise undeniable that the Italian legislator is not bound to remove the restrictions 
currently limiting the effects of children adoption by singles.
4 Reference is made to the judgement of the Italian Corte di Cassazione dated 14 February 2011, No 3572.
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40. The above has eventually been clarified by the Italian Constitutional Court in its decision No 
183/1994, where it referred to the 1967 Strasbourg convention on children adoption, to which Italy is a 
contracting party. Even though Art 6 of such convention entrusts singles with the possibility to adopt, it 
is however left to the discretionary power of any contracting party the decision whether or not to imple-
ment such possibility within their respective legal system5. 
41. The same considerations were made by the Italian Supreme Court on the occasion of the 
abovementioned decision No 3572/2011, which eventually reiterates what it already pointed out in pre-
vious judgements6. 
42. Nor can Art 8 of the ECHR – which, as recalled, consecrates the right to family law – be read 
as grounding the right to adopt nor certainly the right of a single person to become an adoptive parent.
43. The issue of adoption by single persons has been dealt with by the ECtHR in the E.B. case7, 
concerning a homosexual woman who claimed to have been denied intercountry adoption due to her 
being homosexual. She therefore lodged a claim to the Court that her fundamental right to family life 
had been violated also in light of the prohibition of discriminations based on sex as equally enshrined 
by the Convention (Art 14).
44. In addressing the case, at para 49 the Court pointed out that “The present case does not 
concern adoption by a couple or by the same-sex partner of a biological parent, but solely adoption by a 
single person. Whilst Article 8 of the Convention is silent as to this question, the Court notes that French 
legislation expressly grants single persons the right to apply for authorisation to adopt and establishes a 
procedure to that end. Accordingly, the Court considers that the facts of this case undoubtedly fall within 
the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. Consequently, the State, which has gone beyond its obligations 
under Article 8 in creating such a right – a possibility open to it under Article 53 of the Convention – 
cannot, in the application of that right, take discriminatory measures within the meaning of Article 14.”
45. In other words, the Court is of the view that Art 8 does not entitle, in itself, single persons 
to adopt. However, provided that the national legislator – as the French legislator did – entrusts single 
persons with the right to adopt, such right automatically falls within the scope of application of Art 8 
and must as such be granted to, and exercised by, any single person, with no room for discriminatory 
measures (also) based on sex which the Convention, as seen, prohibits pursuant to Art 14.
V. Cross-border continuity of familial status created abroad as a fundamental right safeguarded 
by Article 8 ECHR
46. However, the ECtHR has also interpreted Art 8 of the Convention as encompassing the prin-
ciple whereby familial status validly and permanently established abroad must be given transnational 
effects.
47. In light of the Wagner (2007)8 and Negrepontis (2011)9 judgements, in particular, it seems 
possible to hold that a violation of Art 8 may occur also when a State denies recognition of a foreign 
decision establishing a familial status. 
5 Reference is made to the convention made on 24 April 1967, which Italy has ratified and ordered the implementation of 
by means of Law No 357 of 22 May 1974. Pursuant to the abovementioned Art 6, such convention permits adoption “by either 
two persons married to each other, whether they adopt simultaneously or successively, or by one person”. 
6 In particular, see the judgement of the Italian Corte di Cassazione dated 18 March 2006, No 6078.
7 Judgement of 22 January 2008, application No 43546/02, available at hudoc.echr.coe.int.
8 Judgement of 28 June 2007, application No 76240/01, available at hudoc.echr.coe.int.
9 Judgement of 3 May 2011, application No 5659/08, available at hudoc.echr.coe.int.
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48. From the Court’s viewpoint, such a violation occurs when the conditions established by a 
State for the purposes of recognising foreign decisions fall short of the requirements laid down by the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR itself. Namely, when they fail to either pursue a legitimate aim or comply 
with the proportionality principle. 
49. Both in Wagner and Negrepontis, therefore, the Court ruled that the national authorities 
respectively sitting in Luxemburg and Greece violated Art 8 of the Convention due to the fact that, re-
lying on the relevant rules of domestic law, they refused to recognise the effects of adoption decisions 
rendered abroad. The violation was found in that such denial amounted to a disproportioned interference 
with the applicants’ right to fully enjoy their familial status as constituted abroad. 
50. In the Wagner case, in particular, the effects of the adoption established in Peru could not 
be recognised in Luxembourg because, according to the relevant conflict of laws rules existing in this 
latter State, the law applicable to adoption was that of Luxembourg, pursuant to which full adoption was 
precluded to unmarried people such as the adoptive parent was in the case at issue.
51. In the Court’s opinion, domestic rules such as the ones coming into play in the Wagner 
case have to be regarded as inadmissibly affecting the right to family life of the persons involved in the 
familial relationship; it therefore arises that, according to the Court, such right also entails, and grants 
protection to, the expectation of said persons that the foreign decision be recognised, in each and every 
national legal system, the very same effects as those displayed in its country of origin.
52. And the stricter and tighter is the link existing between the familial relationship and its State 
of origin, the more this expectation is to be deemed covered by Art 8 of the Convention.
53. As remarked in literature, the abovementioned jurisprudence of the ECtHR does not neces-
sarily mean that “conflict of law rules are to be set aside if their enforcement gives rise, in the case at 
stake, to the infringement of a fundamental right”.
54. Rather, it seems that the Court’s statements imply its aim “to simply clarify that States are 
bound to carefully appreciate the effective impact that their private international law rules are liable to 
have on the social reality, with a view to assessing the adequacy (rectius, proportionality) thereof to 
achieve the objective pursued” 10.
55. Art 8 is therefore violated if an adoptive relationship constituted abroad is denied recogni-
tion of those very same effects which are to be deemed stemming therefrom according to the law which 
governed its establishment within the country of origin.
56. The above, however, requires an important clarification which can be equally inferred from 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence.
57. The duty to ensure that foreign decisions are granted cross-border continuity does not entail 
that the requested State give the familial relationships constituted abroad effects other than those deriv-
ing therefrom pursuant to the rules which grounded their creation.
58. Thus, according to the clarifications provided by the ECtHR in the Harroudj v. France 
judgement, no violation of Art 8 occurs if a State, such as France in the case at issue, refuses recogni-
tion as adoption of a foreign decision regarding a child whose national law does not conceive, or even 
prohibits, the application of such institution11.
10 C. Campiglio, Identità culturale, diritti umani e diritto internazionale privato, in Riv. dir. int., 2011, p. 1029.
11 Judgement of 4 October 2012, Harroudj v Francia, application No 43631/09, in Revue critique DIP, 2013, p. 146. In 
brief, the case concerned the question whether France was to be found in violation of Art 8 ECHR due to its having refused 
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59. In other words, what has to be ascertained in order to exclude the existence of any violation 
of Art 8 is that the familial status constituted abroad is recognised the very same effects as those dis-
played in the State of origin but not that it is also given other or further effects.
60. To this purpose, States other than the one where the relationship was created are bound to rec-
ognise it, as the case may be, also by treating it in the same way as they treat familial relationships grounded 
on categories of domestic law which, despite not being exactly equivalent, are eventually of a similar nature.
61. Given that, in the abovementioned Harroudj case, the French approach eventually permitted 
that the kafala created abroad – despite being not capable of recognition as adoption due to such latter 
institution being prohibited by the child’s national law – continue nonetheless to display its very same 
effects also in France, the Court ruled that such country could not be found to be in violation of Art 8. 
Indeed, by treating the kafala as a legal institution, substantially equivalent, existing under domestic law, 
i.e. guardianship, France had fulfilled its obligations under Art 8 of the Convention12.
62. However, the solution endorsed by the Court confirms that Art 8 is to be deemed violated when-
ever the requested State – instead of treating the familial relationship created abroad in the same way as do-
mestic legal institutions of an equivalent or similar nature – limits the effects or alter the very nature thereof 
in a manner incompatible with the principle of cross-border continuity covered by Art 8 of the convention.
VI. The irreconcilability of the Italian approach with the Strasbourg jurisprudence on Art 8 ECHR
63. In light of the abovementioned jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, the question arises 
as to whether the Italian regime of recognition of single persons’ adoptions may be deemed compatible 
with Art 8 of the ECHR.
recognition as adoption of a kafala care relationship created in Algeria between an Algerian minor and a French woman. The 
ground for such refusal was to be found in the provision, laid down in the French Civil Code, (Art 370-3 of the Code Civil, as 
brought about by Law No 111 of 6 February 2001), whereby adoption of a child is precluded «si sa loi personnelle prohibe cette 
institution, sauf si ce mineur est né et réside habituellement en France». On said judgement see, in addition to S. CornEloup, 
Revue critique DIP, 2013, p. 161; P. KinsCh, Harroudj v. France: Indications from the European Court of Human Rights on the 
nature of choice of law rules and on their potentially discriminatory effect, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 2013-
2014, p. 39; A. Di PasCalE, La kafalah al vaglio della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo: tra tutela dell’interesse del minore 
e preoccupazioni di ordine pubblico, in Dir. imm. citt., 2012, p. 112, also C.E. Tuo, Riconoscimento degli effetti delle adozi-
oni straniere e rispetto delle diversità culturali, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 2014, p. 43. On the kafalah care institution see R. 
ClEriCi, La compatibilità del diritto di famiglia mussulmano con l’ordine pubblico internazionale, in Fam. dir., 2009, p. 197; 
C. Campiglio, Il diritto di famiglia islamico nella prassi italiana, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 2008, p. 43.
12 All the more so since the prohibition at issue, according to the same French rule taken into account (see above, fn 11), is 
not to be read as absolute, given that, on the contrary, it allows for the adoption of the child (i) in case the latter was born and 
habitually resides in France; (ii) as soon as the minor, placed with a French citizen, has him/herself acquired the nationality of 
said country. And it bears mentioning that also more recently, even though on the question of cross-border continuity of famil-
ial status other than the adoptive one – i.e. the parent-child relationship based on medically assisted procreation –, the ECtHR 
(judgements of 26 June 2014, Menneson v France, application No 65192/11, and Labassee v France, application No 65941/11) 
declared that contracting States cannot be deemed liable for the violation of the right to family life consecrated by Art 8 of the 
convention if they refuse (as France did in the cases at issue) the transcription of birth certificates issued abroad whenever the 
reasonable suspect exists that birth took place by means of surrogated maternity due to the contrast of such technique with 
the national public policy. The reason behind this conclusion is that – as it is stated, in particular, in the Menneson v France 
judgement (especially at paras 92-94) – the interferences with the full enjoyment of said right which eventually derive from 
the denial of recognition are not such as to prevent family life from going on without excessive obstacles also in the requested 
State. However, the fact that Art 8 cannot be deemed violated as regards the right to family life has not prevented the Court from 
taking an opposite position with respect to the children’ right to private life. According to the Court, in fact, said subjects - ow-
ing to their status validly constituted abroad being denied recognition – are deprived of their personal identity as well as of the 
rights (such as the succession rights) that they would have been endowed with had their status been recognised in the requested 
State. Such situation is all the more regrettable when – as in the case at issue – one of the parents (namely, the father) is also 
the true biological parent of the children. The biological parenthood amounts to an essential part of personal identity, with the 
consequence that when such link has already been ascertained the denial of the legal effects thereof is against the best interests 
of the child seeking for its recognition together with his or her biological parent.
The Italian regime of recognition of intercountry adoptions...Chiara EnriCa Tuo
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2015), Vol. 7, Nº 2, pp. 357-368
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt
366
64. As a matter of fact, it seems hardly deniable that – if examined through the lens of the Stras-
bourg jurisprudence – the mechanism whereby such adoptions are recognised pursuant to domestic law 
would be regarded as not capable of ensuring that an adoptive status created abroad be granted that very 
same degree of cross-border continuity which the ECtHR identifies as a mandatory condition of compli-
ance with Art 8 ECHR.
65. It is certainly true that the Italian courts do not address such adoptions as devoid of any effect 
in our legal order. However, it is likewise undeniable that single persons’ adoptions are prevented from 
displaying in Italy the very same effects which legitimately derive therefrom according to the rules of 
their State of origin. 
66. Neither is the public policy clause capable of grounding such restrictions of the right en-
shrined in Art 8 ECHR. As well known, according to the ECtHR jurisprudence it is by means of public 
policy that – subject to well-established conditions – States are enabled to exercise the margin of appre-
ciation they are endowed with in the accomplishment of their duties under the Convention13. 
67. Public policy, however, can no longer be conceived as aimed at protecting merely national 
values, given that such values may be invoked as limits to the recognition of legal relationships created 
abroad only insofar as they either are entailed among principles common to the States party to the Con-
vention or eventually represent the very constitutional identity of said States14.
68. As seen, the approach of the Italian Supreme Court is that full adoptions established abroad 
in favour of single persons cannot be given their whole effects due to their being contrary to the Italian 
principle of public policy whereby only married couples are entitled to adopt15.
69. It therefore seems highly debatable that such approach would be endorsed by the ECtHR.
70. Indeed, it is the Italian law on adoption itself that, even though in exceptional cases, ad-
mits that single persons be entrusted with full adoption of children (see the already mentioned Art 25, 
paras 4-5). 
71. Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that in most European States this kind of adoption is 
nowadays no longer subject to limitations, irrespective of the sexual orientation of the adoptive par-
ent. As a matter of fact, single persons are presently entitled to adopt children in Germany (§ 1741.2 of 
B.G.B.); in France (Art 343-1 of the Code Napoleon as reformed by Law No 66-500 of 11 July 1966); in 
Switzerland (Art 246-b of the Civil Code as amended by the Federal Law of 30 June 1972); in Sweden 
(Chap. 4, Section 1 of the Parenthood and Guardianship Code); in Norway (act. No 8 of 28 February 
1986 relating to adoption, issued by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs); in the 
UK (2002 Adoption and Children Act). 
72. Likewise, in the majority of the other European countries – such as Belgium, Ireland, Fin-
land, Austria and Spain – the trend is toward fostering intercountry adoptions even when the adoptive 
parent is a single person, without limiting them to exceptional cases, provided that a careful evaluation 
is carried out on a case by case basis as of the capability of the applicant to become an adoptive parent. 
73. Furthermore, against the Supreme Court approach stands the consideration that issues con-
cerning parental relationships such as the adoptive ones must always be dealt with in light of the princi-
13 See P. TanzarElla, Il margine di apprezzamento, in M. CarTabia (ed.), I diritti in azione, Bologna, 2007, p. 145.
14 See S.M. CarbonE, I diritti della persona tra CEDU, diritto dell’Unione europea e ordinamenti nazionali, in Dir. Un. 
eur., 2013, p. 1, esp. pp. 25-26; C.E. Tuo, La rivalutazione della sentenza straniera nel regolamento Bruxelles I: tra divieti e 
reciproca fiducia, Padua, 2012, esp. pp. 113-124.
15 Reference is made to the already mentioned judgement of the Italian Corte di Cassazione No 3572/2011.
The Italian regime of recognition of intercountry adoptions...Chiara EnriCa Tuo
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Octubre 2015), Vol. 7, Nº 2, pp. 357-368
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt
367
ple of the child’s best interests, which has to both underlie the general rules governing such matters and 
drive the effective application thereof16.
74. It is eventually Art 35.3 of the Italian law on adoption itself which – in making the recogni-
tion of intercountry adoptions conditional upon the respect of the fundamental principles that govern, 
in Italy, family matters – expressly prescribes that said principles are put into force having regard to the 
child’s best interests. 
VII. The way forward: proposal for a necessary review of the Italian approach
75. For such interests to be effectively enhanced and, at the same time, for the risk that our 
country be found in violation of Art 8 ECHR to be avoided, it seems therefore highly advisable that our 
courts give whole effects to intercountry single persons full adoptions. 
76. At least, such solution should be endorsed with regard to those Italian singles who moved 
their residence to the country of origin of adoption and have thus reached such a level of integration with-
in the community thereof to be entrusted, pursuant to the law of that country, with full adoption of a child.
77. In this perspective, it seems worth mentioning the 27 April 2007 judgment whereby the Bo-
logna Youth Court stated that “to give whole effects to a single person full adoption cannot be deemed 
in contrast with the so called Italian public policy” 17.
78. The case concerned an Italian single woman residing in Argentina for more than ten years at 
the time she was entrusted with the full adoption of a child. Such adoption has been given full effects by 
the Italian Youth Court of Bologna on the grounds of the general mechanism of recognition of foreign 
judgements as laid down by Law No 218/1995. 
79. Such conclusion was reached by the Tribunal after having declared that the special rules on 
adoption cannot come into play whenever – as in the case at issue – adoption is not granted in favour of 
a married couple but rather of a single person. In these cases, it is pursuant to the general rules governing 
recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions (Arts 64 ff. of Law No 218/1995) as referred to by Art 
41 of Law No 218/1995 that adoptions are to be given effects in our legal system. 
80. The same conclusion has more recently been reached by the 17 April 2013 judgement of the 
same Bologna Youth Court18. The case concerned again the recognition of a full adoption, which this 
time had been established in the USA where the adoptive parent, an Italian single, resided for years. 
81. The application for recognition has been endorsed again on the basis of Arts 64, 65 and 66 
of Law no 218/1995, in light of the consideration that (i) even though “adoption by a couple of married 
people represents the preferred solution as opposed to that of adoption by a single person” given that 
“taking into account the child’s best interests” the latter “has certainly the right, whenever possible, to 
establish and maintain a permanent relationship with a father and a mother”, “this does not prevent that 
in particular cases an adoptive link is created with a single parent”; (ii) such possibility – as remarked by 
the Youth Court – is contemplated by the same Italian law on adoption, which admits it, as full adoption, 
pursuant to Art 25.4-5; (iii) as a consequence, to give whole effects to a single person’s full adoption – in 
addition to being not disruptive of the overall domestic legal system – also represents “an unquestion-
able advantage in the child’s best interests”, “at least in cases such as the one at issue”.
16 See, for instance, para 133 of the Wagner judgement (above, fn 8) and para 95 of the E.B. judgement (above, fn 7).
17 In Il merito 2007, p. 38.
18 Available at http://dirittocivilecontemporaneo.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ASTONE-TRIB-MINORENNI-BO-
LOGNA-17-aprile-2013.pdf.
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82. The Bologna Youth Court has therefore proceeded to the correct recognition as full adoption 
of the relationship established abroad on the basis of a reading of the public policy clause which can be 
certainly deemed compatible with the indications provided by the ECtHR.
83. As a matter of fact, not only have the effects stemming from the foreign decision been as-
sessed in light of their consistency with the fundamental principles which govern Italian law on family 
matters; such effects have also been appreciated taking into account the child’s best interests, which, 
as seen, constitute in themselves a pillar of our legal system and which are as such safeguarded by the 
same public policy clause. 
84. The recognition as full adoption has been deemed compatible with the above principles in 
that full adoption ensures greater stability than adoption in particular cases can do (given that the latter 
may in some cases be revoked and is eventually devoid of effects vis-à-vis the adoptive parent’s family). 
85. It cannot be overlooked, however, that such solutions may give rise to cases of, so to say, 
“reverse discrimination”, to the prejudice of Italian singles that, whilst maintaining their residence in 
Italy, are entrusted with full adoption of a child in a foreign country. The application that these persons 
would file for the recognition of the related foreign decision as full adoption would indeed continue to 
be dismissed, given that (pursuant to Arts, as the case may be, 35, para 1, 35, para 4 or 36, para 2, of the 
Law No 184/1983) said adoptions would still be awarded only the limited effects stemming from adop-
tion in particular cases.
86. It is therefore desirable that some changes be brought about by the Italian legislator. 
87. In favour of a removal of the existing limitations to the adoption of single persons actually 
stand (i) Art 2.1 of the 1993 Hague Convention19 and, more in general, the principle of the child’s best 
interests which underpins the rules on adoption currently existing in Italy as the result of the implemen-
tation, in our legal system, of the abovementioned convention; (ii) the already mentioned Art 6 of the 
1967 Strasbourg convention as well as Art 7 of the 2008 convention, which has superseded the former 
(but to which Italy is not a contracting party), and which, in the opinion of some scholars, has to be read 
as depriving the States party of the freedom to choose whether to enable single persons to adopt or not20; 
(iii) the Italian Constitutional Court, which, by its decision No 183/1994, having regard to Arts 3, 29, 30 
of the Italian Constitution has clarified that such provisions cannot be construed as preventing adoption 
by single persons save for the exceptional cases currently envisaged by the Italian Law on adoption; 
such Law limits itself to express a preference for adoption by a married couple whereas Arts 3, 29 and 
30 of the Italian Constitution are not against a legislative innovation recognising in a wider range of 
cases that – subject to specific circumstances predetermined by the law itself or to be appreciated, on 
a case by case basis, by the competent court – adoption by a single person be qualified as the solution 
more suitable to satisfy the child’s interests”; (iv) the jurisprudence of the Italian Supreme Court which 
(by its judgments No 3572/2011 and No 6078/2006) – in underlining that Art 6 of the 1967 Strasbourg 
convention entitles a single person to adopt – points out that the national legislator would be empowered 
to widen the conditions for admissibility of full adoption of children by single persons.
19 Such Article, in drawing the limits of the subjective scope of application of the convention, expressly refers to adoption 
“by spouses or a person”. On this convention see above, § I.
20 E. LamarquE, Adozione da parte dei single omo e eterosessuali: i paesi del Consiglio d’Europa stanno perdendo il loro 
margine di apprezzamento? available at www.forumcostituzionale.it.
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